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Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix also
examine a number of counterintelligence issues, such as the 1961 Christine
Keeler affair in Britain and, more important, the treason of John Walker,
who spied for the Soviets from 1967 to
the mid-1980s and whom the authors
describe as “one of the greatest espionage successes in history.”
Two concluding chapters introduce orthogonal themes, such as the 1980s Soviet operations that culminated in the
“Whiskey on the Rocks” (a euphemism
for the grounding of a Soviet submarine
in Swedish territorial waters) and a bizarre account of how UFOs might have
altered the strategic balance during the
Cold War.
Huchthausen and Sheldon-Duplaix offer an interesting and entertaining read,
one that shows that U.S. naval attachés
at times work in difficult and dangerous
circumstances. However, because of its
excessive use of anecdotes, this book
does not add much to the body of
knowledge about naval espionage—neither that of the United States, of the Soviets, or of anyone else.
JEROME J. BURKE

Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Washington, D.C.

Rhys-Jones, Graham. Churchill and the Norway
Campaign. South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and
Sword, 2008. 223pp. $33

“The principle of aiming everything at
the enemy’s center of gravity admits of
only one exception—that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally
rewarding.” This classic dictum, given
to us by the great military theorist Carl
von Clausewitz, provides the impetus
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behind this book. Originally conceived
as a case study for inclusion in the
Strategy and Policy curriculum at the
U.S. Naval War College, this historical
work covers the operations in Norway
during the spring of 1940, one of the
most overlooked campaigns of the Second World War. The reader is presented with a complete account, in a
fast-moving and easy format, of the
strategic decision making that eventually led both Great Britain and France,
on the one side, and Germany, on the
other, to conclude that opening a new
theater in Norway could in fact be
“exceptionally rewarding.”
While Churchill figures prominently in
the book’s title, the reader will find examined not only his policy decisions
and strategic ideas discussed at length
but also the actions and decisions of
numerous other participants in the governments of the major belligerents.
Most studies concerning the war in the
West in 1940 focus on the French military’s epic defeat, but Rhys-Jones offers
an account of French participation in
the war as Great Britain’s strategic partner. The strategic partnership between
the Neville Chamberlain and Édouard
Daladier governments in the spring of
1940 is a subject that usually does not
get much attention, but an interesting
account of that short-lived alliance can
be found in this book.
Rhys-Jones, a former member of the
Naval War College faculty, presents his
analysis in a manner that both students
and faculty at the college will find familiar. He begins at the policy level, focusing on the benefits and drawbacks
that each major participant concludes
are relevant to undertaking operations
in what was considered a secondary theater. He then outlines each belligerent’s
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strategy before presenting a thorough
examination of operations and tactical
considerations for both land and maritime forces involved in the campaign.
The outcome in Norway was never a
foregone conclusion. Germany’s tactical
prowess and brilliant leadership at the
small-unit level are conveyed nicely,
leaving the reader to actually wonder
throughout the narrative whether the
Germans can pull off such a bold and
daring feat of arms.
It is a tribute to Rhys-Jones’s authoritative approach to the subject matter and
his fine writing style that he has created
such a useful study of the elements—
the matching of strategy and policy, the
conduct of joint operations, and the
wisdom of opening a new theater—
while at the same time telling a riveting
story.
Any student of grand strategy, as well as
the casual reader, will find plenty of
value in this well written historical narrative. If there is a waiting list of books
to be included into the curriculum at
the Naval War College, this book
should top the list.
JEFF SHAW

Naval War College

Kuehn, John T. Agents of Innovation: The General
Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the
Japanese Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2008. 296pp. $32.95

Skeptics of disarmament treaties, such
as Richard Pearl, have long argued that
these treaties make a nation weaker by
depriving it of the means of self-defense.
John Kuehn, former naval aviator and
presently professor of military history
at the U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is far more subtle in this
excellent book. He shows how the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 froze
battleship construction and yet made
the U.S. Navy stronger by 1941. While
it is never easy to prove something so
counterintuitive, Kuehn does it hands
down.
How did this happen? First, by freezing
the building of battleships the treaty
drove the Navy to invest more time,
money, and imagination into other
projects, particularly submarines and
aircraft carriers. These ships had greater
potential than the battleship, which had
just about reached its maximum technology by the end of World War I. In
addition, by preventing the United
States from enhancing its base fortifications west of Hawaii, the treaty drove
the Navy to design new vessels of much
greater operational radius, build floating dry docks, and enhance its total
transport capabilities. By World War II,
the U.S. Navy could do the seemingly
impossible: beat a peer competitor in
the western Pacific without permanent
bases in the area of operations.
One wonders why the Japanese did not
take advantage of the constraints imposed by U.S. arms limitations. Kuehn
offers a convincing explanation, by focusing on the General Board of the U.S.
Navy. Whereas the Royal Navy and the
Imperial Japanese Navy were hierarchal
and faction ridden, the U.S. General
Board was collegial, collaborative, and
remarkably open to new ideas from all
branches of the service, virtually irrespective of rank. Both the British and
the Japanese fell far behind in antisubmarine warfare. The Japanese stuck to
their Mahanian dogma of decisive naval
battle conducted by large battleships.
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